

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 15, 1961


Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Lincoln:

I should be most grateful if you could ensure that the President has a chance to read my letter of today, a copy of which is enclosed, prior to his conversations with Chancellor Adenauer.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,



CLAIBORNE PELL

Enclosure

United States Delegation
NATO Parliamentarians' Conference
Paris, France

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NATO Parliamentarians'
Conference
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The Honorable John F. Kennedy
The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I respectfully, but urgently, request that you read this before your meeting with Chancellor Adenauer.

My three weeks in Eastern and Central Europe, including a motor trip in the Oder-Weisse territory, confirmed my own conviction in the correctness of the broad outline of the proposals I laid before you concerning Berlin and Germany.

There are, though, several points I hope you may particularly consider.

1. The one factor that would do more to wean Poland from the Soviets than anything else we could do is to recognize the Oder-Weisse line. The Poles I saw at all different levels of life, unofficial and official, had the fear of German reconquest more in their minds than any other single worry. Their historic dislike of the Russians remains excelled only by their fear and dislike of the Germans.

In this connection, there is scarcely a single German left in the Oder-Neisse territory. Moreover, General de Gaulle has recognized this western Polish frontier for many years.

2. The people of Eastern Europe would naturally like freedom. But the ones with whom I spoke would prefer their present status of political servitude to liberation by atomic war. Here it must be borne in mind too, except for East Germany and Slovakia, the working man in Eastern Europe is generally economically better off than he was before.

3. The Germans themselves are not as upset as is Adenauer at the idea of two Germanies. West Germany has now less in common, politically, socially, and economically with East Germany than it has with Austria. And those Germans whose hearts are set on unification would consider Anschluss the next step, a thought that is bad taste to even mention! Moreover, the European mind is not too disturbed that East Germany, which is basically historic Prussia, is outside of the European community of nations when it recalls what it has done towards destroying Europe in the past. The Germans themselves also realize their own inflammatory nature. It is for that reason that so many individual Germans do not want the atomic weapon. The Germans recognize, too, the impossibility of squaring German unification with the integration of West Germany into Europe. And German sentiment immensely favors the latter.

4. If you could persuade Chancellor Adenauer that his greatest contribution to a rapidly integrated Western Europe and a more peaceful Europe as a whole would be recognition of the Oder-Neisse and acceptance of the

loss of Prussia, each already a fait accompli, my observation is that the Germans could find this acceptable. Actually, the German Social Democratic Party had these ideas in its Deutschland Plan of 1959. And you know today's weaker position of the Christian Democrats in relation to the Social Democrats.

5. My conversation with General Clay led me to believe he had a better grasp and longer term approach towards the problem of Germany than had any other official with whom I talked. I gave him your message of greeting and complete confidence in him.

With warmest respectful regards,

Ever sincerely,

C.P.

Claiborne, Pell